We present an infinite-game characterization of the well-founded semantics for function-free logic programs with negation. Our game is a simple generalization of the standard game for negation-less logic programs introduced by van Emden [M.H. van Emden, Quantitative deduction and its fixpoint theory, Journal of Logic Programming 3 37–53] in which two players, the Believer and the Doubter, compete by trying to prove a query. The standard game is equivalent to the minimum Herbrand model semantics of logic programming in the sense (...) that a query succeeds in the minimum model semantics iff the Believer has a winning strategy for the game which begins with the Doubter doubting this query. The game for programs with negation that we propose follows the same rules as the standard one, except that the players swap roles every time the play “passes through” negation. We start our investigation by establishing the determinacy of the new game by using some classical tools from the theory of infinite-games. Our determinacy result immediately provides a novel and purely game-theoretic characterization of the semantics of negation in logic programming. We proceed to establish the connections of the game semantics to the existing semantic approaches for logic programming with negation. For this purpose, we first define a refined version of the game that uses degrees of winning and losing for the two players. We then demonstrate that this refined game corresponds exactly to the infinite-valued minimum model semantics of negation [P. Rondogiannis,W.W. Wadge, Minimum model semantics for logic programs with negation-as-failure, ACM Transactions on Computational Logic 6 441–467]. This immediately implies that the unrefined game is equivalent to the well-founded semantics. (shrink)

Defends confrontational modes of citizenship as a means to reinvigorate democratic participation and regime accountability. A growing number of people are enraged about the quality and direction of public life, despise politicians, and are desperate for real political change. How can the contemporary neoliberal global political order be challenged and rebuilt in an egalitarian and humanitarian manner? What type of political agency and new political institutions are needed for this? In order to answer these questions, Confrontational Citizenship draws on a (...) broad base of perspectives to articulate the concept of confrontational citizenship. William W. Sokoloff defends extra-institutional and confrontational modes of political activity along with new ways of conceiving political institutions as a way to create political orders accountable to the people. In contrast to many forms of democratic theory, Sokoloff argues that confrontational modes of citizenship (e.g., protest) are good because they increase the accountability of a regime to the people, increase the legitimacy of regimes, lead to improvements in a political order, and serve as a means to vent frustration. The goal is to make the word citizen relevant and dangerous to the settled and closed practices that structure our political world and to provide a hopeful vision of what it means to be politically progressive today. William W. Sokoloff is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas, Rio Grande Valley. (shrink)

Philosophical and theological conceptions of eternity frequently define it through a contrast with time’s transience. These conceptions reflect the widespread influence of Augustine’s idea of eternity, where eternity stands atemporally in opposition to time. Such conceptions are problematic for both divine and human relations to the world. However, the work of Plotinus and Boethius shows that eternity can be conceived more inclusively—as transcending time, but nonetheless including temporal change and dynamism within its presence. This facilitates Boethius’ views of divine knowledge (...) and human freedom in ways that are not available to Augustine. His work demonstrates how an inclusive conception of eternity can reconcile the pursuit of eternal wisdom with a commitment to ethical responsibility within the temporal flow of the world. (shrink)

When "Aristotle on Emotion" was first published it showed how discussion within Plato's Academy led to a better understanding of emotional response, and how that understanding influenced Aristotle's work in rhetoric, poetics, politics and ethics. The subject has been much discussed since then: there are numerous articles, anthologies and large portions of books on emotion and related topics. In a new epilogue to this second edition, W.W. Fortenbaugh takes account of points raised by other scholars and clarifies some of his (...) earlier thoughts, focusing on the central issue: how Aristotle conceived of emotional response. Among other matters, he considers laughter, emotion in relation to belief and appearance, the effect of emotion on judgement, and the involvement of pain and pleasure in emotional response. (shrink)

In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke, Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" points the way for logic. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled "My Basic Logical Insights", Frege writes that the word true makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic, asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered". Properly understanding what Frege (...) takes to be at issue here is crucial for understanding his conception of logic and, in particular, what he takes to be its normative status vis-à-vis judgement, assertion, and inference. In this paper, I focus my attention on clarifying the latter claim and Frege's motivations for making it, exposing what I take to be a fundamental tension in Frege's conception of logic. Finally, I discuss whether Frege's deployment of the horizontal in his mature Begriffsschrift helps to resolve this tension. (shrink)

The United States Constitution is arguably the greatest practical achievement of the Enlightenment. Yet most of the elements of the Constitution are borrowed from elsewhere. Its single wholly original component is the separation of church and state. The doctrine of separation has become controversial of late: Numerous ministers and politicians insist that the United States is in truth a "Christian nation" with Christian institutions that has been overtaken by secular humanism; they call for bringing the United States back to its (...) original unity with Christianity. They argue, accordingly, that although toleration of other faiths might be practiced, the explicitly Christian character of the nation and its political institutions should be reasserted in law and policy rather than denied by secularists. Pat Robertson, for example, has maintained that separation of church and state is a "lie of the left.". (shrink)

The American Foundation Myth in Vietnam deals with how the results of the Vietnam War challenged the long-standing belief in America's role in the world as a unique nation favored by God that carries a global responsibility with it. The author disputes the commonly held belief that America discarded this foundation myth, developed out of John Winthrop's idea of a "city on a hill," following Vietnam. He reexamines the myth in the context of American history to show that the country (...) still firmly attaches itself to the rhetoric of the foundation myth. The analysis divides Americans into one group that believes America's mission cannot be fulfilled without active involvement on the global stage, and one that maintains that its mythic goals are fulfilled most effectively by developing itself as the world's model for freedom and democracy. The tension created between these perspectives creates a dynamic and durable quality that fuels the power of the foundation myth even after a seemingly destructive event such as the Vietnam War. (shrink)